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STEREOTYPES AS CHANNELS AND THE SOCIAL MODEL OF
DISCRIMINATION

MARCIA L. MCCORMICK*
I. INTRODUCTION
The “glass ceiling” is one of many metaphors we use to talk about
systematic inequalities in particular workplaces, the labor force more
generally, and the distribution of social goods along identity lines most
broadly. It was first coined in 1986 to describe the phenomenon of an invisible
barrier that women did not seem to be able to cross in their efforts to ascend to
the highest positions in businesses and government. 1 The focus of most
research and discussion of the glass ceiling has glossed over important racebased inequalities among women; more recently, the barrier that women of
color face has been called the “concrete ceiling.” 2 This shift in language is
important not just to highlight disparities among women, but also to account
for the realities of stalled progress and the debate about how to fix gender gaps.
A glass ceiling can be shattered by a single woman with a hammer, but a
concrete ceiling “‘need[s] a door and there need to be other people on the other
side of that door’” to help a person through. 3

* Thanks to Claire Wiltse for inviting me to participate in this excellent symposium. This essay is
an outgrowth of research that I have been doing for years connected with other projects, and
many research assistants have helped along the way, including James Bertucci, D’Ann Bey, Anne
Blake, John Bowen, Hayley Collins, Jesse Packard, Jillian Plescia, Jessica Scales, and Robert
Zimmerman. The thoughts in this essay have also benefitted from discussions and workshops on
these topics at the annual Colloquium on Scholarship in Labor and Employment Law, the annual
meeting at the Southeastern Association of Law Schools, and internal faculty workshops at the
Saint Louis University School of Law.
1. Carol Hymowitz & Timothy D. Schellhardt, The Glass Ceiling: Why Women Can’t Seem
to Break the Invisible Barrier that Blocks Them from the Top Jobs, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 1986,
at 1; see also ANN M. MORRISON ET AL., BREAKING THE GLASS CEILING: CAN WOMEN REACH
THE TOP OF AMERICA’S LARGEST CORPORATIONS? (1987) (studying women in Fortune 100
companies).
2. Jo Piazza, Women of Color Hit a “Concrete Ceiling” in Business, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27,
2016, at R9. In addition to the concrete ceiling, “bamboo ceiling” is a term coined specifically to
describe the barriers to progress for people of Asian descent. JANE HYUN, BREAKING THE
BAMBOO CEILING: CAREER STRATEGIES FOR ASIANS (2005).
3. Piazza, supra note 2 (quoting Annalisa Adams-Qualtiere, a leader in human resources
departments for a number of large organizations).
1
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This essay's focus will be on the ways that identity matters to advancement
at work, particularly as it is tied to stereotyping and its connection with gender
discrimination. I think we all have a sense about the meaning of these concepts
– of what identity is, what stereotypes are, and how they might work to
discriminate against some historically disempowered groups. And the law,
because we create it, embodies those concepts. Title VII, for example,
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, 4 and the Supreme Court has long
recognized that at least some sex stereotyping, penalizing a woman for not
fitting a stereotype, for example, can be a form of sex discrimination. 5
Despite that understanding and the legal recognition of the pernicious
nature of stereotypes, as the other contributors to this symposium document,
sex-based gaps in occupational categories, in level of achievement, in pay, and
in wealth persist. The law, as it is, is not fixing what is broken. And part of the
reason for the law's ineffectiveness is that much of what we think we know
about identity, what stereotypes are, and how they operate is likely wrong, or
at least not entirely accurate. Our common understanding does not accurately
assess what social science has revealed to be true. As a result, the law as it is
currently enforced does not do a very good job of getting at the cause of
inequality.
First, I have to make a disclaimer because I am a lawyer – and that actually
is the disclaimer. I am a lawyer, not a psychologist, but most of what I am
going to write about is psychological research about the human decisionmaking process in a social context. So why am I talking about the science of
decision-making, you might ask? Maybe this is really obvious, but it is because
human decision-making in a social context is central to the way that paid work
is distributed. In other words, some human's (or group of humans) choice is
usually the gatekeeper to jobs. Understanding how those decisions get made is
central to understanding what is causing them to be made in a way that
contributes to continuing inequalities.
This essay will explore the effects of stereotypes from two standpoints:
their effects on the actions of the person making the decision, and their effects
on the actions of people subject to the decision. Stereotypes influence
cognitive processes in ways the decision-maker may not realize, and being a
subject of stereotyping changes the performance of an actor in ways related
and unrelated to the stereotype. Most of the literature on stereotypes is focused
on only one of these. Looking at both helps us see some reasons why our
current approach to anti-discrimination law, focused mostly on fully self-aware
prejudice and putting the burden on the person subject to discrimination to
recognize and challenge it, is not working to erase inequality and in fact has
institutionalized it.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
5. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989).
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II. STEREOTYPES OF OUTSIDERS
Most of us think of the core of identity as being something fairly fixed and
innate 6 – things people are born with that cannot or should not be changed. Our
sense of identity is who we are and who we believe we have always been.
While we might acknowledge that our identity has been shaped by
experiences, to some extent, we mostly view that as reactive, with those
experiences having happened to us in a way at least somewhat out of our
control. 7 The courts tend to adopt this view as well. We treat sex and race as
part of this core. In the words of the Supreme Court, these are immutable
characteristics with discrete boundaries. 8 Those categories carry with them
more than a simple label, although as discussed in Part III, even a simple label
has powerful consequences. These categories have baggage. They bring with
them a whole group of social meanings that many people believe link the
identity characteristic with behaviors, feelings, and sometimes abilities. And
we all get stuck with that baggage as a function of our interaction with each
other.
What I am describing is what stereotypes are and what effects they have,
but most people do not think of all of that baggage as stereotyping – at least
not the discriminatory kind of stereotyping. Most of us probably think of
stereotypes as the “Archie Bunker” kind of stereotype, which embodies what
we recognize as overt prejudice. Archie Bunker was a character in the
groundbreaking television situation comedy “All in the Family,” a television
series that ran through most of the 1970s. 9 Archie, the father of the family, was
a white blue-collar worker whose vocal prejudices were used to explore
controversial issues like racism, sexism, gay rights, reproductive health, and
the Vietnam War. 10
Prejudice like this often comes in the form of descriptive stereotypes,
descriptions of what people are like, that are often negative and inaccurate.

6. Philosophers have been debating what identity is for centuries, and it is a somewhat
problematic concept because our bodies change over time and defining the mind is difficult. See
generally Eric T. Olson, Personal Identity, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Aug. 20,
2012), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/identity-personal/.
7. See generally ERIK H. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY (1950) (describing identity
formation as the effort by an individual to integrate experiences and characteristics into a stable
sense of self).
8. See e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (noting that “sex, like race
and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth”);
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (contemplating searching
review under the Fourteenth Amendment for “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities . . .
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied
upon to protect minorities”).
9. All in the Family (CBS television broadcast Jan. 12, 1971–Apr. 8, 1979).
10. Id.
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These are also tied to prescriptive stereotypes about what people should be
like. So a stereotype that women cannot stand up to men or should defer to
men or that women cannot do the physically demanding and dangerous work
of firefighters and should not want to do the physically demanding and
dangerous work of firefighters is clearly discrimination. And when many
people think about stereotypes as discrimination, it is this kind of thing they
imagine: a supervisor who is a throwback to an earlier era, skeptical that
women can be good engineers, for example, and so not taking seriously
women who apply for an engineering position. We think that stereotypes are
these explicit prejudices and that they operate as part of people's conscious
decision-making processes, so that if you asked that supervisor why he did not
look at women candidates and he was honest about it, he would say that it was
because he did not think that woman could be good engineers.
That kind of stereotyping does exist, and this kind of discrimination
happens more than we like to think still. 11 But that is really just the tip of the
iceberg about what stereotypes are and how they influence human behavior.
Stereotypes are not always part of our fully conscious decision-making
process, but they still shape what we believe, what we think, and what we do.
Part of the way that our brains work to navigate the world is by creating
categories (or schema) for things that operate as cognitive shortcuts. 12
According to cognitive psychology research, this process is hard wired into our
brains. 13 The things in our world vary incredibly, and if we had to start from
scratch to understand the properties of each variation we encountered, we
would not be able to act. 14 So to function, we generalize about things – objects
and people both – based on a few encounters with them, use those
generalizations to define categories, and in the future, quickly sort new things
into those categories without reflection. 15 You can imagine why this is useful
with a concrete example. I do not have to think about whether this particular
round firm object is edible if it has the characteristics of the category in my
mind called “apple.” And if I have two round, firm, hand-sized objects, but one
has fuzz on the outside, and rebounds slightly when I grip it, I know not to take
a bite out of it because it is a tennis ball, not an apple. So we use the definitions

11. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Discrimination in the Nineties, Seventies Style: Case Studies in
the Preservation of Male Workplace Norms, 9 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J 1 (2005).
12. See JEAN MATTER MANDLER, STORIES, SCRIPTS, AND SCENES: ASPECTS OF SCHEMA
THEORY 1–10 (1984).
13. See id. (describing the process of categorization schemas as automatic).
14. See Eleanor Rosch, Human Categorization, in STUDIES IN CROSS-CULTURAL
PSYCHOLOGY 1, 1–2 (Neil Warren ed., 1977) (“Since no organism can cope with infinite
diversity, one of the most basic functions of all organisms is the cutting up of the environment
into classifications by which nonidentical stimuli can be treated as equivalent.”).
15. Eleanor Rosch, Principles of Categorization, in COGNITION AND CATEGORIZATION 27,
28 (Eleanor Rosch & Barbara B. Lloyd eds., 1978).
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of our categories to define the thing we have encountered and to predict how
that thing is likely to act or what we can do with it. 16 This sorting function lets
us make quick judgments, makes the world seem more predictable, and allows
us to act.
Although this process is important to our ability to function, relying on
categories for quick thinking – in other words, creating group identities – has
deep consequences. Assigning an object to a group makes us see that object
more like other things within that group and less like things outside of that
group. 17 This process works the same way when people are given group
identities. Even when the distinction we make is arbitrary, for example where
people are randomly assigned to teams, those people view members of their
own group (the in-group) as more like themselves, and others (the out-group)
as more different from them than if the others had no group identity. 18 We not
only assign other people to groups; we assign or identify ourselves as part
groups as well, and that process has similarly important consequences. People
who identify as part of a group are also far less able to see differences among
members of the out-group even when they have identical information about
individuals in the out-group and individuals in the in-group. 19
16. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1188–89 (1995).
17. See Donald T. Campbell, Enhancement of Contrast as Composite Habit, 53 J.
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 350, 355 (1956) (finding that when nonsense syllables were linked
to a spot on a spatial continuum, participants tended to judge syllables linked to another spot as
more different from the first than if no syllables had been linked to any spot); Krieger, supra note
16, at 1186 n.103 (describing two studies and citing Henri Tajfel & A.L. Wilkes, Classification
and Quantitative Judgment, 54 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 101, 104 (1963) (when lines were grouped,
participants judged their comparative length as more similar when they compared lines within the
same group and more different when compared to one in the other group than the same people did
when they compared the length of lines not assigned to any group) and Henri Tajfel, Cognitive
Aspects of Prejudice, 25 J. SOC. ISSUES 79, 83–86 (1969) (describing the above experiment in
more detail)).
18. Marilyn B. Brewer, In-Group Favoritism: The Subtle Side of Intergroup Discrimination,
in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 58, 61 (David M.
Messick & Ann E. Tennbrunsel eds., 1996); Ann Locksley et al., Social Categorization and
Discriminatory Behavior: Extinguishing the Minimal Intergroup -Discrimination Effect, 39 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 773, 776–83 (1980); David A. Wilder, Perceiving Persons as a
Group: Categorization and Intergroup Relations, in COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN STEREOTYPING
AND INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR 213, 217 (David L. Hamilton ed., 1981).
19. David L. Hamilton & Tina K. Trolier, Stereotypes and Stereotyping: An Overview of the
Cognitive Approach, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION AND RACISM 127, 131 (John F. Dovidio &
Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986). Many studies that support this point are summarized in Patricia
W. Linville et al., Stereotyping and Perceived Distributions of Social Characteristics: An
Application to Ingroup-Outgroup Perception, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION AND RACISM,
supra at 165, 168–73. Some of these studies asked members of student groups to rate the
similarity of members of their own and other groups and to assess the traits of members of their
own and different groups, asking people to assess how likely someone in their group would fit a
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As you can probably predict from this description, one consequence of
these cognitive structures is the tendency to stereotype, but the stereotype I am
describing does not sound like the prejudice used as part of conscious
processing that we all recognize as discriminatory. Stereotypes are more
powerful than that. They are cognitive shortcuts – part of the process of
perceiving, processing, and remembering information – that link personal traits
with salient characteristics to simplify thinking. 20 Once set, these cognitive
shortcuts “bias[] in predictable ways the perception, interpretation, encoding,
retention, and recall of information about other people,” and they influence
judgment continuously. 21 These cognitive shortcuts create expectations that
actually change how we perceive others, remember things about others, and
interpret motivations for the actions of others. 22 We tend to remember the
things a person actually did only if those actions fit our stereotypes of that
person; we tend to believe we remember a person doing things consistent with
the stereotypes even if the person never did them; and we tend to forget the
things that did not conform to those stereotypes. 23 Additionally, we tend to
assume that a person who acts consistently with a stereotype acted because of
innate characteristics – they are this type of person, so they will usually act this
way – but a person who acts inconsistently with a stereotype acted because of
transitional or situational factors – that they are not this type of person and so
will not usually act this way. 24
Groups or categories are created by our choice of what characteristics
matter – which are salient. 25 Once a characteristic, such as gender or race,
becomes salient to a person, that characteristic defines a group. 26 But what
becomes salient is neither inevitable nor natural. Individuals define what is
salient in any given context. Thus at some point, individuals choose what
makes something a group and who will belong in those groups, although that

stereotype and how likely someone outside of their group would, and asking people with a
particular opinion to rate the similarity of people with the same or a different opinion. Id.
20. Krieger, supra note 16, at 1187–88; Barbara F. Reskin, The Proximate Causes of
Employment Discrimination, 29 CONTEMP. SOC. 319, 321–22 (2000). This description of
stereotypes may sound harmless, but in a society like ours with persistent gaps and inequalities,
stereotypes may perpetuate and even aggravate those gaps.
21. Krieger, supra note 16, at 1188.
22. Krieger, supra note 16, at 1200–09.
23. Krieger, supra note 16, at 1207–09 (summarizing research on stereotypes and memory);
see also Nancy Cantor & Walter Mischel, Traits as Prototypes: Effects on Recognition Memory,
35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 38, 41–45 (1977).
24. Krieger, supra note 16, at 1204–07.
25. See Krieger, supra note 16, at 1190.
26. See Krieger, supra note 16, at 1190.
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choice may not be one taken after reflection, but instead may be something
learned from others in society. 27
Let me give a description of how stereotypes operate in this way. 28
Imagine that you work in an office that starts with a group meeting every
morning at 9 AM. Today, two people, both in their early thirties, were late:
Donna and Jim. Why was Donna late—what do you think the boss and maybe
their coworkers will assume? Getting the kids out the door and to daycare or
school must have been a challenge this morning. You might notice that Donna
looks a little tired. That is probably because her kids kept her up. Maybe one
has been sick. She is having a hard time juggling it all. And she is going to
keep having a hard time because she is going to keep juggling. So is Donna
likely to have a chronic problem of not prioritizing work?
Why was Jim late? Who thinks it is because he had a hard time getting the
kids out the door and to daycare or school? We are likely to attribute Jim's
lateness to traffic, something out of his control. If Jim looks tired is it more
likely because of caregiving or because he has been working too hard? And if
we assume traffic made Jim late and he has been working hard, is Jim likely to
have a chronic problem of not prioritizing work?
The way this plays out is that the person calling the meeting is likely to
interpret the exact same conduct differently depending on whether it was done
by a woman or a man. That person may “remember” Donna's lateness even if
she is almost never late, and may not remember Jim ever being late before
even if he has been. Donna's lateness is more likely to be attributed to her
choices and as part of who she is – as a woman, she is assumed to put her
family before her job. And Jim is assumed to put his job before his family – or
as supporting his family through his devotion to work – and as persistently
making that choice. I hope you can see how the effects of these cognitive
shortcuts can lead to real job consequences for both men and women. Is now
the right time for Donna to get a promotion if we assume she is juggling work
and family? Doesn't Jim seem the more natural choice?

27. See, e.g., H.J. EHRLICH, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE 35 (1973)
(“Stereotypes about ethnic groups appear as a part of the social heritage of society. They are
transmitted across generations as a component of the accumulated knowledge of society.”); David
L. Hamilton, A Cognitive-Attributional Analysis of Stereotyping, in 12 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 53, 64 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1979) (describing how
behaviors get attributed to groups); Richard Nisbett & Kaiping Peng, Culture and Systems of
Thought, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 291, 291–92 (2001) (describing their review of the literature on
how societies differ in systems of thought and drawing conclusions about how those differences
influence cognitive processes).
28. This example is adopted from Joan C. Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping:
Using Social Science to Litigate Gender Discrimination Cases and Defang the “Cluelessness”
Defense, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 401, 433–34 (2003).
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The challenge here is that well-intentioned people have cognitive shortcuts
that cause them to interpret information differently depending on the identity
of the person acting. 29 And especially because most people are wellintentioned and believe they are not consciously using different standards, they
might be more resistant to recognize that their decisions might be flawed. 30 Yet
study after study shows how well-meaning people discriminate on the basis of
sex and race in making employment decisions.
And these externally directed decisions are not the only kind that have
effects on the workplace. Stereotypes also have important effects on the
actions of people who are stereotyped. The next section explores those effects.
III. STEREOTYPES INTERNALLY
Stereotypes are even more pernicious than the prior section described.
They do not just affect people making decisions about other people; they affect
how people themselves perform in different contexts. 31 In other words,
cognitive biases affect how I perceive others, but stereotypes can also affect
how I behave in ways that are difficult for me to control. This phenomenon is
known as “stereotype threat.” This label is imperfect because it suggests that a
person’s performance is affected because he or she is afraid it will fulfill a
stereotype, 32 which in turn could suggest that the solution is for that person
simply to ignore the stereotype and conquer the fear. 33 The label thus implies
that the performance effects are caused by fully self-aware choices. But like
with cognitive biases, this is not the case. I will illustrate by describing some

29. See generally MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN
BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE (2013).
30. See Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (“[T]he human mind defends itself against the
discomfort of guilt by denying or refusing to recognize those ideas, wishes, and beliefs that
conflict with what the individual has learned is good or right.”); id. at 331-36.
31. See generally Sandra Lipsitz Bem, Gender Schema Theory: A Cognitive Account of Sex
Typing, 88 PSYCHOL. REV. 354 (1981) (describing how children learn to define themselves and
learn to evaluate their adequacy as people by gender schema).
32. Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test
Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797, 797 (1995). The
conclusions that are drawn from this study by the authors and others who rely on it as they relate
to cognitive performance are somewhat controversial because of the methodology used in the
study. See, e.g., Paul R. Sackett et al., On Interpreting Stereotype Threat as Accounting for
African American-White Differences on Cognitive Tests, 59 AM. PSYCHOL. 7 (2004); Lee Jussim,
Is Stereotype Threat Overcooked, Overstated, and Oversold?, HETERODOX ACAD. (Dec. 30,
2015), http://heterodoxacademy.org/2015/12/30/is-stereotype-threat-overcooked-overstated-andoversold/.
33. See CLAUDE M. STEELE, WHISTLING VIVALDI 46 (2010) (describing how an “observer’s
perspective” on the cause of underperformance of stereotyped groups leads to conclusions that the
cause is some character or willpower deficiency in the person stereotyped).
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studies that show how stereotypes affect performance in ways difficult to
control.
Many of these studies have been conducted in the context of race, but
some have also been specifically focused on sex. I want to talk mostly about a
couple of race studies, though, because the results are so powerful. You may
be familiar with studies that show African Americans tend to get lower scores
than white people on some standardized tests like the SAT. 34 And women tend
to get lower scores than men on the math portion of the SAT. 35 What you may
not know is that both groups perform differently if they are told something
different about what the test is measuring. 36
You may also only know about stereotype threat studies affecting
historically disadvantaged groups – which tend to give the impression that it is
an issue only for those groups and not for white people when it comes to race
or men when it comes to sex. But this phenomenon works the same way for
majorities, also. My favorite illustration is a set of studies involving white and
black subjects and miniature golf. 37 These studies looked at two different
stereotypes, one that was about black people performing more poorly, and one
that was about white people performing more poorly. 38 The study actually
found stereotype threat affected both white and black subjects. 39
Two groups of golfers, one white and one black, were told before they
began golfing, that the experiment they were a part of was testing the
analytical skills of the participants. 40 A control group of each was not told the
purpose of the experiment. 41 The white golfers did significantly better than the
black golfers in the experimental group. 42 And the black golfers in the control
group did significantly better than the black golfers in the experimental

34. See generally THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP (Christopher Jencks & Meredith
Phillips eds., 1998).
35. See Hannah-Hanh D. Nguyen & Ann Marie Ryan, Does Stereotype Threat Affect Test
Performance of Minorities and Women? A Meta-Analysis of Experimental Evidence, 93 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1314, 1325–26 (2008).
36. Nguyen & Ryan, supra note 35, at 1315, 1316 tbl.2, 1325, 1328; Steele & Aronson,
supra note 32, at 798, 808-10; see also Steven J. Spencer, et al., Stereotype Threat and Women’s
Math Performance, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 4 (1999) (showing that women
performed better on difficult math tests when they were told that the tests had been proven not to
have disparate gender performance compared to the control group which was not told the same
thing about the test).
37. The studies are reported in Jeff Stone et al., Stereotype Threat Effects on Black and
White Athletic Performance, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.1213 (1999).
38. Stone et al., supra note 37, at 1215–16.
39. Stone et al., supra note 37, at 1219, 1223–24.
40. Stone et al., supra note 37, at 1216.
41. Stone et al., supra note 37, at 1216.
42. Stone et al., supra note 37, at 1217 tbl.1.
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group. 43 The second set of experimental groups, again, one white and one
black, were told that the experiment was measuring natural athletic ability. 44 In
this experimental group, the black students outperformed the white students,
and the white students in the experimental group performed significantly worse
than the white students in the control group. 45 For both groups, being told that
the test would measure something that was a negative stereotype resulted in
substantially lower performance, and for both groups, being told that the test
would measure something that was a positive stereotype resulted in better
performance.
This is one set of important studies about the specific role of stereotypes
linked with specific traits, and there are others that suggest that negative
stereotypes can also influence performance more broadly. For example, in the
educational context, African American students tend to underperform
academically; they have poorer grades and other academic outcomes than
white students with the same SAT scores. 46 And at least sometimes, stigma
that embodies a number of negative stereotypes has effects on tasks unrelated
to any particular stereotype. So, for example, members of socially
disadvantaged groups who believe their identity is secret perform puzzlesolving tasks more effectively than members of socially disadvantaged groups
who believe their identity is known to the person evaluating that
performance. 47 So stereotypes can have effects on behavior linked to them and
effects on behavior not linked with them.
Thus, stereotyping affects not just how people make decisions about
others, it also affects how those subject to decisions perform. The cumulative
effect of both sides of this equation has significant implications for antidiscrimination law. The next section explores the law's ability to address them.
IV. ACCOUNTING FOR STEREOTYPES IN LAW
Now that we have an idea of the cumulative effect of stereotypes and how
they might impact the workplace, what do we do with this? One answer is for

43. Stone et al., supra note 37, at 1217 tb1.1.
44. Stone et al., supra note 37, at 1216. A second experiment designed to delve more deeply
into the effect of stereotypes on white people focused solely on white people and athletic ability.
Stone et al., supra note 37, at 1219–21.
45. Stone et al., supra note 37, at 1217 tbl.1. In the study of only white test takers, the white
test takers in the group were told that the test measured hand-eye coordination performed
substantially worse than the control group who were told that the test measured general sports
performance. Stone et al., supra note 37, at 1221–22.
46. See STEELE, supra note 33, at 19–20.
47. See, e.g., Karla Hoff & Priyanka Panday, Discrimination, Social Identity, and Durable
Inequalities, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 206 (2006).
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the law to provide some correction, usually in the form of some penalty. 48 This
is more challenging than it might first appear. Scholars and advocates have
been pushing courts to incorporate this science of human decision-making into
the definition of what discrimination is since at least the late 1990’s,49 and
some judges have accepted that. 50 So far, the Supreme Court has not explicitly
done so, and in fact has rejected its relevance in many discrimination cases
from Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins – which was the first case to recognize sex
stereotyping as discrimination and where the Court mostly ignored the expert
evidence, and focused on the most clearly prejudiced statements as sufficient
to prove sex discrimination 51 – to the Court's most recent discussion in WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes – which rejected a version of the implicit bias
research as relevant to whether the culture of Wal-Mart produced sex
discrimination in promotions and pay. 52
Our legal model of discrimination defines what is unlawful in an extremely
narrow way, a way that does not actually reflect how people behave. Antidiscrimination law penalizes acts that are otherwise perfectly legal if those acts
are done because the actor was motivated by one limited aspect of the identity
of the injured party. 53 Let me be more concrete, using employment law as an

48. Not everyone agrees that the kind of discrimination that is not the fully self-aware
prejudice type of stereotype should be penalized by law. See, e.g., Amy Wax, Discrimination as
Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1130–34 (1999) (arguing that there should be no remedy for the kind
of discrimination that is caused by implicit bias). But others point out that not every legal wrong
requires motive as the state of mind. Marc Poirier, Is Cognitive Bias at Work a Dangerous
Condition on Land?, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 459, 464 (analogizing liability for
discrimination caused by cognitive bias to the law related to dangerous conditions on land);
Michael Selmi, Response to Professor Wax Discrimination as Accident: Old Whine, New Bottle,
74 IND. L.J. 1233, 1234 (1999).
49. See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 16.
50. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988) (implying that
“subconscious stereotypes and prejudices” were a problem that disparate impact discrimination
could reach); Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 59 (1st Cir. 1999) (recognizing
stereotypes as a form of cognitive bias and discrimination); Judge Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling
the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir
Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149,
151–52 (2010) (recognizing the power of implicit biases and their role in decision-making, but
limiting employment discrimination prohibitions to conscious bias).
51. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 255–56 (1989) (holding that sex
stereotyping played a role in the employer’s decision, but finding that the expert evidence of how
stereotypes infect thinking in not fully self-conscious ways was unnecessary because enough
comments showed explicit bias).
52. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 353–55 (2011).
53. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609–10 (1993); see Personnel Adm’r of
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278–79 (1979) (holding that disparate treatment under the
Fourteenth Amendment required discriminatory purpose, which was “more than intent as volition
or intent as awareness of consequences”).
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example of what is true in a variety of contexts. It is perfectly lawful to fire a
person for a good reason, no reason, a stupid reason, or even a morally bad
reason. 54 Under federal law, there are only a few bad reasons that will turn that
lawful act into an unlawful one, and even only a few identity characteristics
that will do so: race, sex, national origin, religion, color, 55 age, 56 disability
unimportant to the particular work at issue, 57 genetic makeup, 58 and
membership in the military. 59
And we give defendants the benefit of every doubt for a number of
reasons. Some are formal and built into the system, like the normal structures
of liability, which provide that plaintiffs bear the burden to prove their
allegations. 60 There are also informal structures too, and one of the most
powerful is the way most of us conceive the world. Many Americans embrace
the just world theory as a core belief. The just world theory posits that good
people are rewarded and bad people are penalized, and vice versa; if a person
is rewarded it was because that person did something good, and if someone is
penalized, that person must have done something bad to cause the penalty. 61
This ideal is woven into the American fabric in the form of the American
Dream: that hard work and perseverance will lead to well-being and
prosperity. 62 When something bad happens to a person, like that they do not
get a job or a promotion or are disciplined or fired, our strongest instinct is to
believe the person did something wrong to cause such a thing unless the
context clearly suggests otherwise.
Relatedly, the concept of discrimination, especially for race, but to some
extent for sex, too, is abhorrent for many white people. 63 It brings up mental
pictures of the Holocaust, firehoses and dogs trained on school children, and

54. See Engquist v. Ore. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 606 (2008).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
56. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2015).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-2 (2012).
59. 38 U.S.C. §§ 4311-19 (2012).
60. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 513–20 (1993) (discussing the importance
of keeping the burden of proof on the plaintiff in a discrimination case).
61. See generally MELVIN J. LERNER, THE BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD: A FUNDAMENTAL
DELUSION (1980) (positing the just world theory as a description of the way people find meaning
in their experiences).
62. See Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Belief in a Just World and Redistributive Politics,
121 Q. J. ECON. 699, 699–702 (2006).
63. I single out white people here purposefully. White people and people of color tend to
define racism differently, with white people defining it as an internal affective state, like fully
self-aware prejudice, and people of color seeing racism in the effects of systems and institutions.
See EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS 8, 11–12 (2d ed. 2006); see also
PEW RESEARCH CTR., ON VIEWS OF RACE AND INEQUALITY, BLACKS AND WHITES ARE
WORLDS APART 11 (2016).
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black men hung from trees. You can imagine the power of that aversion being
multiplied and personalized when an outsider is asked to evaluate a decision
made by someone else. If the evaluator identifies with the person in power,
something it is more likely for white people and men to do, 64 the evaluator will
have an incentive to deny that race or sex had anything to do with the
decision. 65 To admit the possibility of discrimination in a situation where I
identify with the decision-maker is to admit that I might discriminate, which is
morally wrong and which I cannot admit to myself even that I would ever do.
So white people, at least, tend to assume that decisions in the workplace are
not made discriminatorily unless there is fairly strong evidence to suggest
otherwise. 66
The combination of these core values works to place an extra thumb on the
scale for defendants. First, if a bad thing happened to an employee, it is easier
to think that something the employee did wrong caused that bad thing to
happen. Second, it is easier to think that even if the employee did nothing
wrong, at the very least, the defendant was motivated by something other than
the race, sex, or other specially protected identity characteristic of the
employee. For some identity characteristics – particularly race, color, and
national origin, but sometimes also sex, religion, and age – the common
approach is to assume a person would never do that because it is so morally

64. See DANIEL BYRD & BRUCE MIRKEN, POST-RACIAL? AMERICANS AND RACE IN THE
AGE OF OBAMA 16-18 (2011), available at http://greenlining.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/
AmericansandRaceinAgeofObama.pdf (describing how racial resentment and the belief that hard
work leads to success causes more white people to believe that institutions treat black people the
same as or better than white people); see also Pat Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the ColorBlind Judge: An Empirical Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117
(2009) (reporting on empirical study showing that white judges ruled differently on racial
harassment cases than black judges did, regardless of political affiliation); Jennifer L. Peresie,
Note, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate
Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759 (2005) (reporting on empirical study that showed that plaintiffs in
sex discrimination cases were twice as likely to prevail if a woman was on the appellate panel);
Renée Nicole Souris, The Impact of Panel Composition on Sex Discrimination Case Outcomes at
the U.S. Circuit Courts 6 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at
https://www.american.edu/spa/publicpurpose/upload/Panel-Composition-on-Sex-DiscriminationCase-Outcomes-2.pdf (citing some support that gender shapes judges’ attitudes and influences
case outcomes).
65. See Lawrence, supra note 30, at 323, 331–36 (explaining how people who agree that
racism is morally wrong will repress, deny, and sublimate to avoid acknowledging that their
actions or views are racist).
66. A wonderful example of this is Justice Scalia’s statement in Walmart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes that, “left to their own devices most managers in any corporation – and surely most
managers in a corporation that forbids . . . discrimination – would select []neutral, performancebased criteria for hiring and promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all” even if some
managers would take actions that cause disparate impacts and others would engage in disparate
treatment. 564 U.S. 338, 355 (2011).
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wrong. A person would only do that if they have a character defect, and that
character defect would always be on display.
There are even a number of analytical heuristics deployed in employment
discrimination cases that embody these widely shared assumptions. The stray
remarks doctrine discounts the probative effect of explicitly discriminatory
statements, for example, providing that unless a biased statement is explicitly
linked to the employment decision at issue, it is, at the very least, not direct
evidence of discrimination, and may not be probative at all. 67 A similar
heuristic is the same decision-maker defense; if the person who makes a
negative employment decision made a positive employment decision for the
plaintiff before, the court assumes that discrimination cannot be the motive for
the negative decision because a discriminator would never make a positive
decision. 68 Finally, courts tend to infer that intra-group discrimination is
unlikely, at best, so that a female supervisor will not discriminate against
women on the basis of sex, 69 and that if even one member of the employee's
group is treated well, then the employer did not discriminate in this instance. 70
Given the multiple thumbs on the scales in favor of defendants, the law
seems particularly ill-suited to remedy decisions driven by stereotyped
thinking. And because the law – at least the lawsuit as a tool to coerce
wrongdoers to remedy injuries they cause – is focused on changing the conduct
of wrongdoers who harm others, it seems even more ill-suited to provide a
remedy for the way that stereotypes operate to channel a stereotyped person's
behavior.
There is one legal remedy in the antidiscrimination law toolbox that may
be suited to this task: the prohibition on employment practices that cause
disparate impacts on protected groups without a sufficiently necessary business
justification for using those practices. In addition to prohibiting “intentional”
discrimination, Title VII prohibits employment decisions that have
discriminatory effects without considering the employer's motives. 71 In other

67. Nancy J. Gertner, Loser’s Rules, 122 YALE J. ONLINE 109, 118–21 (2012); Kerri Lynn
Stone, Taking in Strays: A Critique of the Stray Comment Doctrine in Employment
Discrimination Law, 77 MO. L. REV. 149, 159–60 (2012).
68. See John J. Donahue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1017 (1991) (laying out the economically grounded
argument that discrimination is based on tastes and assuming those tastes are persistent); Kerri
Lynn Stone, Shortcuts in Employment Discrimination Law, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 111, 126–31
(2011).
69. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80–81 (1998) (recognizing the
possibility that same-sex harassment would violate Title VII, but listing forms of evidence that
were mostly linked to inter-group comparisons).
70. See generally Suzanne B. Goldgberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728
(2011).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971).
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words, criteria that do not explicitly include sex or race, but which negatively
impact men of color or women of all colors are also barred unless those
practices are job related and consistent with a business necessity. 72
Employers have always had the motivation to predict employee value with
information about the potential employee that was easy to get at little cost, and
they used protected classes as proxies for ability in particular fields until
federal law prohibited that. 73 Thus, once explicit consideration of race and sex
was prohibited, employers shifted to other proxies for abilities, like educational
credentials or standardized tests, but those proxies were not always good
predictors and their use frequently weeded out or devalued women and all
people of color. 74 As noted above, at least partly because of the effects of
being stereotyped, acquisition of credentials and performance on standardized
ability tests can mean historically underrepresented groups look less
qualified. 75 This sounds like it is a tailor-made remedy to offset the effects
stereotypes have on those stereotyped, but there are at least two problems with
using disparate impact. First, not all discriminatory effects can be remedied,
only those that cannot be demonstrated to be sufficiently job related. 76 Second,
because intentional discrimination is the model for what counts as
discrimination, courts and at least some members of the public, are hostile to
the idea that these kinds of cases should be allowed to be brought. 77
The Supreme Court, Congress, and the EEOC together have tailored the
disparate impact doctrine to balance the negative effects of using credentials or
tests against employers’ business interests. 78 An employer can use a credential
or test that disparately affects a protected group if the credential or test predicts

72. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52–53 (2003); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424.
73. E.g. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993) (explaining that the goal of the
ADEA was to prohibit discrimination not based on animus, but on stereotypes of older people as
less productive); L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (holding that sex
cannot be used as a proxy for longevity for purposes of pension benefits); see Griggs, 401 U.S. at
424 (describing employer’s historical practice of segregating black employees into lowest paying
jobs and replacement of that system with a high school diploma requirement and the use of
intelligence tests for higher paying positions).
74. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329–32 (1977) (rejecting height and weight
requirements which were used as a proxy for strength that screened out a much larger proportion
of women than men because such requirements were better assessed by testing strength directly).
75. See generally Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009); Dothard, 433 U.S. at 32931; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430.
76. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).
77. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 577 (stating “[a]s enacted in 1964, Title VII’s principal
nondiscrimination provision held employers liable only for disparate treatment. That section
retains its original wording today” and ignoring the original statutory text prohibiting actions that
had discriminatory effects).
78. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(h), (k); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1607 (2016); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 451–52 (1976); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
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success in the position it is used for. 79 For professionally developed tests, the
test must be valid for its use; it must accurately measure or predict what it is
supposed to measure or predict. 80 In addition, an employer must first do an
analysis of the job in question to decide what skills or attributes a person
needs. 81 But if that has been done, evidence that the test was carefully designed
may satisfy the need to demonstrate its validity. 82 This is often not a very
demanding standard.
And the current hostility to disparate impact is serious. The best example
of that hostility is the Supreme Court's decision in 2009 in Ricci v. DeStefano,
where the Court held that a city's decision to throw out the results of a
promotional test because of the serious racial impact the test had was actually
discrimination against white applicants. 83 The Court denigrated the validity of
the disparate impact remedy, stating “[a]s enacted in 1964, Title VII's principal
nondiscrimination provision held employers liable only for disparate treatment.
That section retains its original wording today.” 84 In making that assertion, the
Court cited to the first paragraph of prohibited employment practices, which
prohibits “fail[ing] or refus[ing] to hire or . . . discharge[ing] any individual, or
otherwise . . . discriminat[ing] against any individual . . . because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 85 The Court ignored

79. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436.
80. Id. The EEOC guidelines provide that the American Psychological Association’s
generally accepted professional standards govern a validity analysis, at least for standardized
tests, and that criterion-related, construct, or content validity studies will suffice. 29 C.F.R. §§
1607.5(B), (C). The EEOC defines these concepts this way:
Evidence of the validity of a test or other selection procedure by a criterion-related
validity study should consist of empirical data demonstrating that the selection procedure
is predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of job performance . . .
Evidence of the validity of a test or other selection procedure by a content validity study
should consist of data showing that the content of the selection procedure is representative
of important aspects of performance on the job for which the candidates are to be
evaluated . . . Evidence of the validity of a test or other selection procedure through a
construct validity study should consist of data showing that the procedure measures the
degree to which candidates have identifiable characteristics which have been determined
to be important in successful performance in the job for which the candidates are to be
evaluated.
Id. § 1607.5(B).
81. Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 429–36; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
82. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 592–93 (holding that because the tests at issue were carefully
created, they were valid enough that the employer lacked a strong basis in evidence to believe it
might lose a disparate impact case).
83. See id. at 579–92 (assuming that avoiding disparate impact liability would be disparate
treatment and finding no strong basis in evidence that the city would be liable for the disparate
impact its test caused).
84. Id. at 577.
85. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012)).
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the next paragraph of the original statutory text that prohibited actions that
“would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” language that clearly
reaches discriminatory effects. 86 In addition to the majority's dismissal of the
validity of the disparate impact cause of action, Justice Scalia, in a separate
concurrence, argued that prohibiting disparate impact discrimination violated
the Equal Protection clause because it required employers to consider the race
and sex of employees and applicants in evaluating employment standards. 87
Although Justice Scalia's concerns about disparate impact have not been
mentioned by any other Justices, the hostility to disparate impact seems clear.
In the next Supreme Court case to involve disparate impact in the employment
context, the Court failed to even address the disparate impact claim. 88 Since
then, the Court did recognize the viability of disparate impact under the Fair
Housing Act, so the doctrine is not completely moribund. 89 It still is
endangered, though. The Chief Justice and Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas
dissented, all essentially arguing that disparate impact was not real
discrimination and penalizing it was bad policy. 90 Given the Republican sweep
of the recent presidential and congressional elections and the appointment of
conservative judge Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court, it is likely that the
conservative view of disparate impact will become the majority relatively
soon.
V. CONCLUSION
Because the law as it is applied seems to fall short of correcting for the
effect of stereotyping, something more fundamental needs to happen. One
possibility is an amendment of Title VII to explicitly define discrimination to
incorporate how stereotypes actually work, in connection with greater support
for legal interventions to remedy harmful effects. And we need greater
willingness to accept that the way we've ordered our society is not neutral.
One last issue in connection with identity is important to discuss, and that
is what identity characteristics really are. In this essay, I have focused mainly
on sex and a little bit on race, and though there are differences, there are a lot
of similarities to those identity statuses. We resort to the same main ways to
describe these identities: genes, biological or phenotypical generalities, and

86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012) (emphasis added); see Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426 n.1
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2)).
87. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 594–96 (Scalia, J., concurring).
88. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
89. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2511
(2015).
90. Id. at 2526 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Id. at 2532 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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finally, cultural constructs. For race, the scientific community has reached a
fairly broad consensus that there is as much genetic and biological diversity
within so-called racial groups and maybe more, as there is between them. Race
is pretty clearly a social construct, but it is one with sticking power and real
world effects. Sex is more strongly linked to genetics and biological and
phenotypical generalities, but there is much more variation among humans
than our culture tends to recognize. Much of what we think of as sex turns out
to be socially constructed, just as for race.
And this highlights the stereotype dilemma well. Stereotypes have
“external” effects that injure us when other people make decisions about us,
and they have “internal” effects, when we do not perform as well as we could
on tasks our group is stereotypically bad at and maybe even other tasks there is
no specific stereotype for. Similarly, identity is a complicated negotiation
between the individual and society. To some extent, society or some outsider is
the labeler of race or sex, and to some extent, individuals can self-label.
External and internal labels interact to influence how others treat us and how
we behave. We can choose to perform our identities in ways that meet
expectations about those identities sometimes and to defy expectations other
times. That may not always feel like a choice, and the performance is not
always accepted as possible (or passible) by others. In other words, while I
may have some control over the race or sex I identify as, I cannot completely
control the race or sex others see me as having, and that label and the public
attitudes towards that identity shape my behavior and performance of all kinds
of tasks, not just performance of identity.
This interplay of society and the individual sounds exactly like the social
model of disability, which the disability rights movement used successfully to
advocate for greater access and structural change in a civil rights context. The
key insight of the social model of disability is that while an impairment can be
defined as existing within the body of the individual, the disadvantage or
advantage because of that impairment is not located within the body of the
individual, but instead in how society structures itself. Difficulty walking only
becomes an obstacle when there is a step to surmount. A ramp would not pose
the same difficulty. Like for disability, the markers for race and sex can be
located within the individual, but they do not become a disadvantage or
advantage until they interact with social structures. 91
The core concept here may just be another way to talk about a male norm
or a white norm, but those concepts do not seem to have had a lot of traction
with the courts or the general public. Maybe this is because, as the discipline of
masculinities studies tells us, individual men do not feel powerful. And as
critical race studies tell us about white privilege, it is difficult for all of us of
91. SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 18 (2009).

MCCORMICK MACROED--SUSIE (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

5/16/2017 9:11 AM

STEREOTYPES AS CHANNELS AND THE SOCIAL MODEL OF DISCRIMINATION

19

any race, color, sex, or class, to see privileges we may have. Perhaps changing
the terms we use will help us recalibrate our understanding of discrimination
and make progress towards equality. Until we make some progress there, the
law will not really be able to touch that glass ceiling.

